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C h a p t e r 1
IDIOSYNCRATIC VOLATILITY AND INTERRUPTION MECHANISMS
IN SOUTH KOREAN STOCK MARKETS
Abstract
The purpose of this study is to examine how the volatility interruption mechanisms affect
idiosyncratic volatilities in Korean stock markets. Collecting the South Korea Stock Market
(KOSPI) data from June 15, 2015 to March 31, 2019, we collect each residual„ from three
different estimated models: CAPM, FF3, and FF5. To estimate the conditional idiosyncratic
volatility, we employ two conditional time-varying measurements: GARCH and TGARCH.
Our results show that the conditional idiosyncratic volatility increases when stock prices
reach the upper and lower static limits, indicating the implementation of adopting static
VI mechanism neither stabilize market conditions nor reduce excess volatility along with
the existence of price limits. Although market regulators and policymakers improve market
conditions with the advanced volatility interruption mechanism, our empirical results show
the adverse effect of the mechanism. Not allowing investors to earn above average returns
without accepting above average risks makes Korean stock markets inefficient along with
advanced volatility interruption mechanisms.
JEL classification: G12, G14, G18, G28




In advanced technology and mechanisms, financial regulations and policies have evolved
over time since market regulators and policymakers add in response to failures or breakdowns
in financial markets, and they trim back during financial market booms. The main goal of
market regulators and policymakers is to stabilize financial markets with increased market
efficiency. After the market crash of October 19, 1987, as known as Black Monday, circuit
breakers were proposed by Nicholas Brady, the former United Stated Treasury Secretary,
to temporarily limit trading during periods of exceptional volatility. Market Mechanisms
(1988) suggests setting up wide ranges of bounds to trigger, so that the mechanisms do
not disturb very often, but protect investors from unpredictable market turmoil. Despite of
the initial intention, conflicting interests have discussed in finance literature. Proponents of
price limits claim that the necessity of sophisticated versions of circuit breakers, such as price
limits and trading halts. They believe that sophisticated mechanisms decrease stock price
volatility and counter overreaction without trading activity. On the other hand, critics claim
that price limits provide ambiguous conceptual impact and implication for price movements
and trading interference.
Abad and Pascual (2013) distinguish between two types of price limits, daily price
limits and intraday price limits. Compared daily price limits, intraday price limits, as known
as volatility interruption (VI hereafter), provide much sophisticated mechanisms to finan-
cial markets. VI consists of dynamic volatility interruption (dynamic VI hereafter) and
static volatility interruption (static VI hereafter). These sophisticated mechanisms have
been adopted in European and Asian exchanges, mainly to stabilize their financial markets1.
In this paper, we investigate impact of static VI on the idiosyncratic volatility in
Korean stock markets. They sequentially adopt price limits, dynamic VI and static VI, indi-
cating that Korean stock markets allow us to investigate separate effects of those mechanisms
respectively. Kwon et al. (2018) examine the effect of introducing the dynamic VI and static
VI to the pre-existing price limits in Korean stock markets. They find that dynamic VI
significantly contributes to stabilizing stock prices while static VI does not. Also, they point
out that limited effects of static VI are similar to those of the existing price limits. Early
study of Berkman and J. B. T. Lee (2002) only investigates the effectiveness of price limits
and Seddighi and Yoon (2018) study the recent relaxation of price limits, not dynamic VI
and static VI. Compared with other countries such as Japan, Taiwan and China, only few
related studies of price limits in Korean stock markets have been conducted. Also, condi-
tions that Korean stock markets adopt dynamic VI and static VI sequentially allow us to
1For further details, see Appendix A
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investigate asymmetric impacts of price limits.
The study by Tassinari et al. (2019) illustrates Korean industrial development with
peculiar economic and historical circumstances over the period 1963 through 2012, and
mainly focuses on the relationship between government, markets, and civil society. We
update literature review in Korean stock markets and show the effect of new mechanisms
as well. To distinguish our study with others, we focus on the impact of adopting static VI
associated with the long-run conditional idiosyncratic volatility. Since dynamic VI triggered
when a short-term supply and demand imbalance is very strong, we do not consider the
impact of adopting dynamic VI2. We also investigate how often this phenomenon detected
during a continuous trading session. We focus on Korea composite stock price index (KOSPI
hereafter), which is the largest and integrated exchange in South Korea.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 describes literature review.
Section 1.3 provides motivation and hypotheses of this study. Section 1.4 presents the data
and methodology. Section 1.5 reports empirical results and interpretations. Lastly, Section
1.6 offers concluding remarks of this study.
1.2 Literature Review
1.2.1 Background of Price Limits
Since the first circuit breakers in place following the market crash of October 19,
1987, market regulators and researchers have debated impacts on market intervention mech-
anisms and consequences of possible results from those mechanisms. According to the Brady
Commission Report (1988), more precise market mechanisms are necessary during market
downturns and circuit breaker mechanisms such as price limits and coordinated trading
halts should be formulated and implemented to protect the market system. Subrahmanyam
(1994) interprets a circuit breaker as a mandated trading halt triggered on extreme market
movements. Examining the impact of the circuit breaker, he finds that the circuit breaker
generally increases price variability and the probability of the price crossing the circuit
breaker bounds if the price is very close to the limit. Also, it is not consistent with the
objective of maximizing market liquidity. Lehmann (1989) defines circuit breakers as de-
vices for halting or limiting trading when prices have moved too much. He describes that
some see circuit breakers as self-evident that devices as price limits curb “excess volatility,”
while others suggest that circuit breakers interfere with the price discovery process and the
impounding of information in market prices. Setting up their own regulations with certain
2Abad and Pascual (2010) describe that a dynamic volatility auction may be triggered either by a single,
large-sized market order or by an ordinary market order submitted in times of low liquidity.
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thresholds, for example +/- 10% or +/- 20%, many different countries are followed by the
rules of the United States in imposing circuit breakers in their financial markets.
The 2010 Flash Crash, one of momentous events in the stock market, reminds reg-
ulators and policymakers of the necessity of intervention mechanisms to protect market
participants in market volatility. Subrahmanyam (2013) describes that if impediments to
trade are necessary to combat clearly anomalous price moves, the question is what type of
breakers are the best way to go about the design. He suggests adopting wide enough trigger
bounds based on percentage, avoiding sweep orders, and using different point systems to
compute indices in different markets. Based on different financial market conditions, many
different countries have developed and implemented updated versions of circuit breakers in
their financial markets. Abad and Pascual (2013) describe more detailed and sophisticated
versions of circuit breakers, such as price limits and trading halts. According to their study,
price limits are either daily based or intraday based. Daily based price limits, as known as
static VI, set a daily percentage range of trading that is based on previous day’s closing
price, thus stabilizing and curbing day-to-day volatility. Compared with daily based price
limits, intraday based prices limits, as known as dynamic VI, are more advanced mechanisms
because it is triggered when the difference between a stock’s most recent execution price and
potential execution price exceeds a specified price range. C. M. Lee, Ready, and Seguin
(1994) investigate the efficacy of trading halts by examining the effect of firm-specific NYSE
trading halts on volume and price volatility. Focusing on the levels of trading volume and
price volatility, they conclude that trading halts do not reduce either trading volume or price
volatility.
1.2.2 Proponents of Price Limits
Price limits have two main attributes to control volatility. First, they establish price
constraints. Secondly, they provide time for rational reassessment during times of panic
trading. As advocates of price limits, Ma, Rao, and Sears (1989) investigate the price limits
and the empirical behavior of futures prices for a selected group of commodities around
price limits. They find that prices tend to either stabilize or reverse directions, indicating
that price limits provide a cooling-off effect during the period for the market. By employing
China’s experience with price limits, K. A. Kim, Liu, and Yang (2013) test the performance
of price limits by examining stock price behaviors during periods with and without price
limits from the same market. They conclude that price limits can facilitate price discovery,
moderate transitory volatility, mitigate abnormal trading activity, and help market recovery
following crashes. Recently, Wan et al. (2018) investigate the cooling-off effect by using
the intraday-level high frequency data in Chinese stock markets. They find that price limits
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provide a positive effect on maintaining the stability of the Chinese stock markets because the
price limits restrict the investors’ irrational behavior. Abad and Pascual (2007) investigate
the magnet effect3 of price limits in the Spanish Stock Exchange (SSE), where limit hits
trigger five-minute trading halts, followed by continuous trading with revised price limits.
Analyzing both the price patterns and the trading behavior, they conclude that there is no
magnet effect of price limits.
Overall, proponents of price limits claim that price limits decrease stock price volatil-
ity, counter-overreaction, and do not interfere with trading activity. They also advocate that
price limits provide important considerations to market regulators and policymakers who
continue to weigh the benefits and costs of price limits.
1.2.3 Critics of Price Limits
or more than a decade, however, other academic researchers and practitioners have
found evidence of costs to imposing price limits. After the market crash of October 19,
1987, there has been increased interest in the usefulness of price limits as well as other
forms of market intervention mechanisms. Lehmann (1989) states that price limits not only
have an ambiguous conceptual impact on liquidity around limit price moves, thus increasing
volatility, but also have no clear implications for the behavior of prices on the day after a
limit price move. Kuhn, Kuserk, and Locke (1991) find that price limits are ineffective in
decreasing volatility during the 1989 U.S. mini-crash. E. Fama (1989) proposes the delayed
price discovery hypothesis. As price limits represent upper and lower bounds on stock prices,
some trading usually decreases or stop until the limits are revised creating an interference
with the price discovery process.
Examining the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TYO), K. A. Kim and Rhee (1997) support
three main hypotheses such as volatility spillover, delayed price discovery, and trading inter-
ference, indicating that price limits may be ineffective. For stocks that experience limit-hits,
they document that volatility does not return to normal levels as quickly as the stocks that
do not reach price limits (volatility spillover hypothesis), price continuations occur more
frequently than for stocks that do not reach limits (delayed price discovery hypothesis), and
trading activity increases on the day after the limit day, while all other stock subgroups ex-
perience drastic trading activity declines (trading interference hypothesis). Supporting the
study of K. A. Kim and Rhee (1997), Deb, Kalev, and Marisetty (2017) provide new evidence
on efficacy of daily price limits, employing propensity score matching techniques to reduce
the possible sample selection bias4. Results of their study are consistent with the findings
3The magnet effect causes to push prices further towards the price upper or lower limits.
4They also provide conflicting evidence that supports proponents of price limits to reduce transitory
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of K. A. Kim and Rhee (1997). They also show that price limits affect volatility spillover
for upper limit hits, but lower limit hits. Bacha and Vila (1994) investigate price volatility
of the Nikkei 255 stock index and its futures contracts traded on Singapore International
Monetary Exchange (SIMEX), Osaka Securities Exchange (OSE) and Chicago Mercantile
Exchange (CME). They find that completing the markets by creating derivative securities
seems to be more effective in stabilizing prices than imposing restrictions on trading and on
price movements.
To investigate whether illiquid stocks are especially vulnerable to price limits,G.-M.
Chen, K. A. Kim, and Rui (2005) use data from the Chinese stock exchanges, where stocks
have different ownership structures5. They find that illiquid stocks hit price limits more
often than liquid stocks and hence stocks with wide bid-ask spreads are constrained by
narrow price limits. Using transactions data from Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE), Bo,
Yong, et al. (2009) explore the magnet effect of price limits. According to their study, when
limit hits are imminent, stock prices approach the price limits at faster rates, with higher
trading intensity and larger price variation. When stock price approach the floor limits, they
observe lower than normal market conditions’ trading volume and size, but a wider spread.
Employing account-level data from Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE), T. Chen et al. (2019)
analyze how daily price limits affect market dynamics and whether the daily price limits may
induce destructive trading behavior by a group of speculators against other investors. They
find a set of results indicating that the daily price limits may have an unintended effect of
inducing large investors to pursue a destructive strategy of pushing up stock prices to the
upper price limits and then selling on the next day. This unintended effect highlights the
challenge in designing the trading system for emerging markets.
Employing intraday data from Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE), Cho et al. (2003)
investigate the magnet effect of price limits. They find a significant tendency for stock prices
to accelerate toward the upper bound and weak evidence of acceleration toward the lower
bound as the price approaches the price limits. Using transaction data from the Taiwan
Stock Exchange (TSE), Hsieh, Y. H. Kim, and Yang (2009) find evidence of the magnet
effect of price limits, a finding with important regulatory implications. They show that the
conditional probability of a price increase (decrease) increases significantly when the price
approaches the upper (lower) price limits. They state that the magnet effect receives support
from not only the greater conditional probability, but also the increasing price limits moves
when the price approaches the limits. Tooma (2011) investigates the magnet effect of price
volatility on lit hit days and do not spillover the post limit hit days.
5In the Chinese stock markets, there are A-shares and B-shares. A-shares are owned by local Chinese
citizens and B-shares are owned primarily by foreigners or overseas Chinese citizens.
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limits in the Egyptian Stock Exchange (EGX) and his findings are consistent with the early
study of Cho et al. (2003).
Overall, critics of price limits claim that price limits provide ambiguous conceptual
impact and implications for price movements. In addition, academic researchers and prac-
titioners support three main hypotheses such as volatility spillover, delayed price discovery
and trading interference with many empirical evidence and studies.
1.2.4 Korea Stock Exchange (KRX)
Based on the fixed amounts, price limits first initiated on March 3, 1956 in the Korean
Stock Exchange (KRX). On April 1, 1995, the KRX made a modification on its price limits
to be based on fixed rates instead of fixed amounts and the rates have gradually increased
to 30% from 6%. In addition, market regulators have adopted two volatility interruption
mechanisms to keep maintaining stable market conditions.
Berkman and J. B. T. Lee (2002) investigate the effectiveness of price limits by
examining market characteristics around a revision in the price limit system on the Korean
Stock Exchange (KRX). They find the evidence of a positive relationship between price
limits and long-term volatility and a negative relationship between price limits and trading
volumes. Based on their empirical results, stricter price limits have benefits, especially in
emerging markets, despite the cost of preventing trading on limit-hit days. In addition,
adverse effects of the widening of price limits are greater for small stocks, providing possible
explanation why strict price limits frequently adopt for emerging markets. Seddighi and
Yoon (2018) examine the efficacy of the Korean stock markets with reference to the recent
relaxation, from 15% to 30%, of price limits. Using the daily returns of the market index and
60 stocks selected from different industrial sectors, they find that compared with 15% price
limits, the number of stocks following the random walk process increases under the 30% price
limits, indicating that Korean stock markets become more efficient as daily price limits are
expanded. Kwon et al. (2018) investigate the effect of sequential introducing the dynamic
VI and static VI to the pre-existing price limits in the Korean Stock Markets. According to
their study, dynamic VI contributes significantly to stabilizing stock prices, but static VI.
Also, they find that the limited effects of static VI come from its similar functionality to the
existing price limit system in Korean stock markets.
1.2.5 Dynamic and Static Volatility Interruptions
In extreme market conditions, market participants can be over-reacting rather than
be rational. Due to such market distortions, they need cooling-off time to make rational de-
cisions. In the relatively short history of security trading, to protect market participants and
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improve market conditions, the Korean stock markets have adopted circuit breaker system
to provide cooling-off period for market participants in times of sudden market downturns6.
It also adopted a sophisticate microstructure mechanism, called volatility interruption (VI).
This mechanism consists of two components: dynamic and static. In other words, Korean
stock markets operate a daily price limit system, a circuit breaker, and an arrangement to
ease volatility of individual issue system to prevent sharp fluctuations in stock prices7.
The Korean stock markets adopted the dynamic VI first on September 1, 2014, and
then static VI on June 15, 2015. The sequential adaptations of dynamic VI and static VI to
the Korean stock markets provide market participants with a cooling-off period to alleviate
emotional stress or deliver time to analysis new information of market downturns. Because
there is no limit to the numbers of times VI can be triggered in a day these two different
VI mechanisms can be differentiated by their purposes and reference prices. Dynamic VI
is a mechanism to relieve a short-term volatility caused by supply-demand imbalances or
fat-finger errors. This mechanism is invoked when the newly executed price is 2 to 6% than
the last execution price. The specific thresholds for dynamic VI for KOSPI 200 constituent
stocks are 2% for closing auction, 3% for continuous auction and 3% for off-hours single price
auction. The thresholds for KOSPI and KOSDAQ markets are 4% for closing auction, 6%
for continuous auction and 6% for off-hours single price auction. This mechanism is effective
during the continuous trading, closing trading and off-hour periodic trading sessions. Static
VI is a tool to relieve a long-term cumulative price change caused by a specific or various
quotation. This tool is invoked when the price changes by 10% or more from the previous
single price execution for all stocks on the KOSPI and KOSDAQ markets. This mechanism
is effective during the continuous trading and opening/closing trading sessions.
When a dynamic VI or static VI is triggered, the orders are received for 2 minutes for
periodic call action and then executed. If it occurs during a continuous trading session, the
session would be converted to periodic call auction, and for periodic call auction, the time
would be extended.
1.3 Motivation and Hypothesis Development
Since the 1987 Black Monday and the 2010 Flash Crash, many countries and ex-
changes have developed and adopted a new trading mechanism to improve stable market
conditions and decrease market volatility. Major European exchanges such as Euronext,
Bolsa de Madrid (BME), Deutche Borse, London stock exchange (LSE) do not have price
6In Korean stock markets, circuit breaker system has only applied to market indices, we do not discuss
it in this study.
7Appendix C provides the Korean stock market timelines.
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limits but employ elaborate volatility mechanisms such as dynamic VI and static VI that
protect investors and listed firms from uncertainty to crisis. Two major exchanges in United
States, New York stock exchange (NYSE) and national association of securities dealers au-
tomated quotations (NASDAQ), only adopt dynamic VI, indicating that market regulators
and policymakers allow investors and listed firms to interact more freely. Compared with
European and US exchanges, Asian exchanges are complicated because they have price lim-
its, but fully or partially adopt dynamic VI or static VI. This comes from different levels
of market and political conditions. In Japan, Japan exchange group (JPX) adopts not only
price limits, but also dynamic VI and static VI. It operates multiple exchanges such as Tokyo
stock exchange (TYO) and Osaka securities exchange (OSE). Another major exchange in
Asia, Taiwan stock exchange (TWSE) adopts price limits and dynamic VI, but static VI.
Shanghai stock exchange (SSE) only adopts price limits. In the relatively short history
of security trading, the Korean stock exchange (KRX) adopts dynamic VI and static VI
sequentially along with price limits, which have increased over time.
We focus on one specific type of circuit breaker, the VI mechanism, static VI and
examine how static VI affects the idiosyncratic volatility of common stocks traded under
a group of Korea Composite Stock Price Index (KOSPI). According to Abad and Pascual
(2010), dynamic VI is triggered by either by a single, large-sized market order or by an
ordinary market order submitted in times of low liquidity, indicating that it usually captures
when a short-term supply and demand imbalance is very strong. Eom et al. (2015) analyze all
dynamic VI events in the three months following the adoption and find that dynamic VI does
not contribute meaningfully to market stabilization in the two major Korean stock markets,
KOSPI and KOSDAQ. Following this notion, we do not consider an impact of adopting
dynamic VI8 and investigate an impact of adopting static VI on the conditional idiosyncratic
volatility in the KOSPI market. The main reason we initiate this study in the KOSPI market
is that sequential introduction of volatility interruption mechanisms allows us to investigate
whether the mechanism mitigates day to day volatility and protect investors and listed firms.
Also, conducting this study allows us to update outdated market microstructure literature
in Korean stock exchange.
The main implementation of adopting static VI mechanism is to stabilize market
conditions and reduce excess volatility along with price limits. Nevertheless, investors and
listed firms are sensitive to the stock price movements either upward or downward, indicating
that volatility has an impact on price movements. Investors overreact or underreact based
on their information, and it compounds volatility. The study of Diacogiannis et al. (2005)
8Another reason to not consider dynamic VI is a lack of intraday data accessibility.
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examines the overreaction hypothesis and its association with the existence of price limits,
indicating that investors overreaction is present when price limits hit the upper bound. E.
Fama (1989) also points out that investors tend to overreact or underreact, when they get
good or bad news in the market. As a result of their reactions, stock prices move up or down
toward their equilibrium levels. Following this notion, we expect idiosyncratic volatility
increases when stock prices move either upward or downward. We test the following two
hypotheses:
H1: Idiosyncratic volatility increases when a stock price hits the upper static limit.
H2: Idiosyncratic volatility increases when a stock price hits the lower static limit.
If these two testable hypotheses are true, the results allow us to conclude that Korean
stock markets are inefficient financial markets along with the advanced volatility interruption
mechanism, static VI, indicating that market regulators and policymakers are failure to
maintain stable market conditions due to its adverse effect.
1.4 Data and Methodology
We obtain daily stock prices and other related financial data from Thomson Reuters
Datastream. All data for this research span from June 15, 2015 to March 31, 2019. We chose
June 15, 2015 to be the starting date for our sample because the static VI first introduced
the date we chose as the starting date. To avoid survivorship bias, we include delisted firms
and new IPOs during our sample period. The final sample consists of 790 firms listed on
KOSPI market. We focus on the KOSPI stocks to test static VI in the continuous trading
session between 9:00 am and 3:20 pm. To begin with, we count the number of static upper
and lower hit occurrences.
To estimate the idiosyncratic volatility, we employ the capital asset pricing model,
Eugene F Fama and French (1993) three-factor model, Eugene F Fama and French (2015)
five-factor model. The main reason to employ three different asset pricing models is for the
robustness check and to show that our empirical results are consistent with model selections.
To begin with, based on the notion of Sharpe (1964), the estimated CAPM model as follows:
Ri,t −Rf,t = αi + βi,t(Rm,t −Rf,t) + εi,t (1.1)
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where Ri,t is the return on asset i in period t, Rf,t is the risk-free rate in period t,
βi,t is the beta on asset i in period t, Rm,t is the market portfolio in period t, and εi,t is the
zero-mean residual in period t. We estimate Eugene F Fama and French (1993) three-factor
model as follows:
Ri,t −Rf,t = αi + βi,t(Rm,t −Rf,t) + siSMB + hiHML+ εi,t (1.2)
Eugene F Fama and French (1993) three-factor model is an extension version of
CAPM model along with two additional factors, SMB and HML. SMB is the return on a
diversified portfolio of small stocks minus the return on a diversified portfolio of big stocks.
HML is the difference between the returns on diversified portfolios of high and low M/B
stocks9. We estimate Eugene F Fama and French (2015) five-factor model as follows:
Ri,t −Rf,t = αi + βi,t(Rm,t −Rf,t) + siSMB + hiHML+ riRMW + ciCMA++εi,t (1.3)
Eugene F Fama and French (2015) five-factor model is an extension version of Eugene
F Fama and French (1993) three-factor model along with two additional factors, RMW and
CMA. RMW is the difference between the returns on diversified portfolios of stocks with
robust and weak profitability, and CMA is the difference between the returns on diversified
portfolios of low (conservative) and high (aggressive) investment stocks. We construct Fama
and French three and five factors following the notion of Eugene F Fama and French (1993)
and Eugene F Fama and French (2015)10.
From three different estimated models above, we obtain the conditional idiosyn-
cratic volatility measures by utilizing time-varying variances. Bali and Cakici (2008) employ
GARCH (1, 1) model of Bollerslev (1986) to estimate the conditional idiosyncratic volatility.
They state that GARCH (1, 1) model is relatively simple and easy to follow properties for
time aggregation and stationarity. One main drawback of GARCH model is that the model
cannot capture the leverage effect. There are many asymmetric GARCH models that esti-
mate the leverage effect. EGARCH introduced by Nelson (1991) and TGARCH introduced
by Zakoian (1994) are employed by measuring asymmetric impact of positive and negative
information. Fu (2009) and Glosten, Jagannathan, and Runkle (1993) employ EGARCH
9Bagchi (2012) employs Fama and French 3 factor model to investigate the direct and cross-sectional
relationship of India volatility index (VIX).
10We follow the description of Fama and French 5 factors from Ken French’s website and compare our
constructed factors to Fama and French emerging factors. See Appendix E.
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and TGARCH respectively to estimate the conditional idiosyncratic volatility. According to
Bollerslev (1986), GARCH (1, 1) model is specified as follows:
hi = α0 + α1ε
2
t−1 + β1ht−1 (1.4)
TGARCH (1, 1) introduced by Zakoian (1994) is given as follows:




t−1 + β1ht−1 (1.5)
where dt−1 is a dummy variable that is equal to one if et−1 < 0 (bad news) and is
equal to zero if et−1 ≥ 0 (good news). From the results of these models, we could collect
residuals as our conditional idiosyncratic volatility.
1.5 Empirical Results
1.5.1 Summary Statistics
Table 1 reports the summary statistics for entire 790 stocks listed on KOSPI market.
Based on different VI mechanisms and size of firms, KOSPI stocks consist of two subgroups:
KOSPI 200 constituent stocks and general issues. Although the static VI is subject to +/-
10% for them, we generate summary statistics for these subgroups because it allows us to
investigate some characteristics of Korean firms11. On Table 1, we separately report each
KOSPI group on Panel A, Panel B, and Panel C.
We report three generated summary statistics during our sample period between June
15, 2015 and March 31, 2019. The maximum and minimum stock returns are between -30%
and 30% due to the price limits. Annualized average return of KOSPI stocks is close to
4.60% and we do not observe high and low spikes in stock return because the VI mechanism
constrains upper and lower boundaries. The huge variations of maximum and minimum
prices of open, close, intra-high and intra-low come from different price levels of stocks listed
on the KOSPI market. The annualized average return of KOSPI general issues is 4.69%,
while annualized average return of KOSPI 200 constituent stocks is 4.28%.
Table 2 reports the upper and lower static volatility interruption hits in the KOSPI
market during the continuous trading session. Compared with the dynamic VI12, static VI
is invoked when the price changes by +/- 10%. Sorted by year, 235,157 times the static VI
11South Korea’s Chaebol is a large conglomerate that is run and controlled by an owner or family member.
12Based on different thresholds, the dynamic VI consists of KOSPI 200 constituent stocks and KOSPI
General issues. KOSPI 200 constituent stocks are subject to narrow upper and lower thresholds, +/- 3%
and KOSPI General issues are subject to wide ranges of upper and lower thresholds, +/- 6%.
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics
Table 1 reports summary statistics for 790 stocks listed on KOSPI. Based on different thresh-
olds of dynamic VI, its sample consist of two subgroups: KOSPI 200 constituent stocks and
general issues. KOSPI 200 constituent stocks have represented 200 stocks and general issues
have 590 stocks. For static VI, we combine all 790 stocks and generate summary statistics
during our sample period between June 15, 2015 and March 31, 2019.
Stats Open Close Intraday High Intraday Low Daily
Price Price Price Price Return
Panel A. Summary Statistics for entire stocks listed on KOSPI
Mean 43,884.31 43,864.83 44,576.18 43,167.18 0.000126
Median 11,450 11,400 11,650 11,200 0
Std. Dev. 105,594.30 105,587.70 107,232.40 103,976.10 0.028
# of Year 5 5 5 5 5
# of Firms 790 790 790 790 790
# of Observations 697,789 697,789 697,789 697,789 696,880
Panel B. Summary Statistics for KOSPI 200 Constituent Stocks
Mean 113,346.30 113,328.90 115,075.00 111,614.50 0.000117
Median 51,700.00 51,700 52,500 50,900 0
Std. Dev. 177,725.30 177,794.50 180,406.90 175,145.60 0.023463
# of Year 5 5 5 5 5
# of Firms 200 200 200 200 200
# of Observations 180,277 180,277 180,277 180,277 180,071
Panel C. Summary Statistics for KOSPI General Issues
Mean 19,686.99 19,666.78 20,017.68 19,323.32 0.000128
Median 6,990 6,980 7,100 6,860 0
Std. Dev. 42,010.72 41,884.43 42,805.05 41,115.42 0.028995
# of Year 5 5 5 5 5
# of Firms 590 590 590 590 590
# of Observations 517,512 517,512 517,512 517,512 516,809
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were triggered from June 15, 2015 to March 31, 2019. The number of hits consists of 89,144
static upper hits and 146,013 static lower hits. The years following the implementation
of the VI rules, 2018, witnessed the highest static VI occurrences with a total of 65,604
limit reaches. Out of the 65,604 hits, 25,311 static upper hits and 40,293 static lower hits
are observed. Sorted by industry, finance, chemical, and electrical and electronic equipment
industries are observed the highest static VI occurrence with 32,332, 28,083, and 17,498 limit
hits, respectively. Conversely, fishing, mining, medical and precision machines industries are
witnessed the lowest static VI occurrences with 160, 541, and 817 limit hits, respectively.
1.5.2 Volatility Interruptions and Idiosyncratic Volatility
To figure out the positive or negative relationship between idiosyncratic volatility and
static VI hits, we first need to create two dummy variables - static upper and lower hits -
in this study. These first steps allow us to test our two hypotheses that there is a positive
or negative relationship between idiosyncratic volatility and upper or lower static VI hits.
Following the notion of Ferreira and Laux (2007) and Lins, Servaes, and Tamayo (2017) we
set up the fixed effect panel regression model as follows:
ψi,t = γ0 + γ1LimitDummyi,t + γ2ROEi,t−1 + γ3Leveragei,t + γ4MTBi,tγ5MktCapi,t + εi,t
(1.6)
where ψi,t measures the idiosyncratic volatility for each firm taking log of the condi-
tional variance based on GARCH (1, 1) and TGARCH (1, 1) for three asset pricing models.
LimitDummyi,t is the VI dummy associated with the number of static upper or lower limit
hits. ROEi,t−1 is the firm return on equity ratio, Leveragei,t is the firm debt to asset ratio,
MTBi,t is the firm market-to-book ratio, and MktCapi,t is the firm’s market capitalization.
To distinguish the impact of the different market conditions on the idiosyncratic volatility,
SentimentDummyi, is included in the equation. We collect the consumer sentiment index
(CSI) data from Bank of Korea and constructed a dummy variable. Korean consumer senti-
ment dummy is associated with the high- and low- consumer expectations in South Korea13.
Also, we include time dummy and firm fixed effect as Lins, Servaes, and Tamayo (2017) to
control issues associated with a changing economic and political environment over time.
The main independent variable is Static Upper and Static Lower, which are a limit
dummy that takes the value of 1 if the triggered condition is met, or the value of 0 other-
wise. With the model above, a positive relationship between the idiosyncratic volatility and
13We follow the studies of Chung, Hung, and Yeh (2012), Wang (2018a) and Wang (2018b) to investigate
investors’ trading behaviors in different market conditions.
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Table 1.2: Static Upper and Lower Hits for KOSPI Markets
Panel A and B on Table 2 report the upper and lower static volatility interruption hits of
entire stocks listed on KOSPI market during the continuous trading session (09:00 - 15:20).
The sample period is from June 15, 2015 to March 31, 2019.
Panel A. Upper and Lower Static VI Hit stocks listed on KOSPI by Year
Year Static Static Occurrences of
Upper Lower Static VI
2015 12,024 21,004 33,028
2016 22,290 36,974 59,264
2017 23,242 37,657 60,899
2018 25,311 40,293 65,604
2019 6,277 10,085 16,362
Total 89,144 146,013 235,157
Panel B. Upper and Lower Static VI Hit stocks listed on KOSPI by Industry
Industry Static Static Occurrences of
Upper Lower Static VI
Chemicals 10,575 17,508 28,083
Communications 931 932 1,863
Construction 2,947 5,455 8,402
Distribution 5,734 10,557 16,291
Electrical and Electronic Equipment 6,274 11,224 17,498
Electricity and Gas 2,953 3,997 6,950
Finance 11,309 21,023 32,332
Fishing 19 141 160
Food and Beverages 4,425 5,817 10,242
Iron and Metal Products 5,076 8,290 13,366
Machinery 2,434 5,169 7,603
Medical Supplies 6,178 9,513 15,691
Medical and Precision Machines 268 549 817
Mining 110 431 541
Non-metallic Mineral Products 1,748 3,487 5,235
Other Manufacture 2,877 4,353 7,230
Paper and Wood 3,315 5,038 8,353
Services 7,652 11,860 19,512
Textile and Wearing Apparel 4,787 6,292 11,079
Transport Equipment 4,652 7,923 12,575
Transport and Storage 4,880 6,454 11,334
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static upper and lower hits is expected. ROE and Leverage show the capital structure of the
listed firms, which can directly impact the idiosyncratic volatility, because a higher level of
leverage leads to a higher level of ROE. With Market-to-book (M/B) and market capital-
ization (Size) variables, we investigate how large and small firms impact to the idiosyncratic
volatility notion of rational market conditions and expect a negative relationship between
the idiosyncratic volatility these variables. We anticipate a positive relationship between the
idiosyncratic volatility and consumer expectations. Wang (2018a) describes that investors
are likely to trade in stock market when investors are relatively optimistic, so their partic-
ipation in stock market distorts the risk-return tradeoff. To correct for heteroscedasticity,
serial correlation, or contemporaneous cross-sectional correlations of error terms by adjusting
standard errors for clustering at the firm level, we employ the method of Rogers (1994).
Table 3 reports the estimation results of the panel regression based on Model (6)
for a total of KOSPI 790 firms. The dependent variable in column (1) is the conditional
idiosyncratic volatility estimated from GARCH (1, 1) in equation (4) on the CAPM model in
equation (1). The dependent variable in column (2) is the conditional idiosyncratic volatility
estimated from TGARCH (1, 1) in equation (5) on the CAPM model. The dependent
variable in column (3) is the conditional idiosyncratic volatility estimated from GARCH (1,
1) in equation (4) on the Eugene F Fama and French (1993) three-factor model in equation
(2). The dependent variable in column (4) is the conditional idiosyncratic volatility estimated
from TGARCH (1, 1) in equation (5) on the Eugene F Fama and French (1993) three-factor
model. The dependent variable in column (5) is the conditional idiosyncratic volatility
estimated from GARCH (1, 1) in equation (4) on the Eugene F Fama and French (2015)
five-factor model in equation (3). The dependent variable in column (6) is the conditional
idiosyncratic volatility estimated from TGARCH (1, 1) in equation (5) on the Eugene F
Fama and French (2015) five-factor model14.
The coefficients of static upper are positive and statistically significant at the one
percent confidence level for our all six model specifications, which are 0.5474, 0.5495, 0.5378,
0.5402, 0.5380, and 0.5405 respectively. These results indicate that when stocks listed on
KOSPI market reach the upper static limit, + 10%, the idiosyncratic volatility increases
by approximately 0.54%. The coefficients of static lower are also positive and statistically
significant at the one percent confidence level through our all six models 0.5880, 0.5905,
0.5798, 0.5826, 0.5801, and 0.5831 respectively, indicating that when such stocks reach the
lower static limit, - 10%, idiosyncratic volatility increases by approximately 0.58%. This
empirical evidence provides support to our testable hypotheses that idiosyncratic volatility
14We also use EGARCH model to estimate the idiosyncratic volatility and confirm that EGARCH model
provides consistent results.
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Table 1.3: Conditional Idiosyncratic Volatility
Table 3 reports the results of estimating the panel regression fixed effect models for a total
of KOSPI 790 firms. The dependent variable is the firm’s conditional idiosyncratic volatility
measured using GARCH (1, 1) and TGARCH (1, 1) from estimating the capital asset pricing
model (CAPM),Eugene F Fama and French (1993) three-factor model, and Eugene F Fama
and French (2015) five-factor model. Along with control variables, the main independent
variables are static uppers and lowers which are dummy variables that equal to 1 if they
hit their thresholds and 0 otherwise. Following the notion of Rogers (1994), we collect t-
statistics. We report the results of entire stocks listed on KOSPI market for static upper and
lower limits. The sample period is from June 15, 2015 to March 31, 2019.
CAPM FF 3-Factor FF 5-Factor
GARCH TGARCH GARCH TGARCH GARCH TGARCH
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Static Upper 0.5474 0.5495 0.5378 0.5402 0.5380 0.5405
(51.22) (51.39) (50.02) (50.23) (50.06) (50.29)
ROE 0.1164 0.1032 0.0753 0.0666 0.0766 0.0674
(8.41) (7.46) (5.59) (4.94) (5.66) (4.98)
Leverage 5.30E-10 5.15E-10 4.44E-10 4.38E-10 4.26E-10 4.21E-10
(7.59) (7.41) (6.46) (6.38) (5.80) (5.71)
M/B -0.2554 -0.2484 -0.2017 -0.1994 -0.1834 -0.1811
(-9.14) (-8.92) (-7.70) (-7.64) (-7.03) (-6.96)
Size -4.54E-17 -4.00E-17 -3.08E-17 -2.77E-17 -3.39E-17 -3.07E-17
(-4.82) (-4.48) (-3.93) (-3.75) (-3.99) (-3.81)
Sentiment 0.0114 0.0112 0.0120 0.0117 0.0123 0.0121
(4.38) (4.30) (4.58) (4.49) (4.72) (4.63)
Obs. 696,701 696,701 696,701 696,701 696,701 696,701
R2 0.0518 0.0513 0.0499 0.0496 0.0495 0.0492
Static Lower 0.5880 0.5905 0.5798 0.5826 0.5801 0.5831
(49.49) (49.68) (48.62) (48.85) (48.68) (48.92)
ROE 0.1410 0.1278 0.0992 0.0906 0.1004 0.0914
(10.10) (9.18) (7.36) (6.72) (7.43) (6.76)
Leverage 5.42E-10 5.28E-10 4.56E-10 4.51E-10 4.38E-10 4.33E-10
(7.60) (7.42) (6.50) (6.42) (5.85) (5.77)
M/B -0.2618 -0.2550 -0.2081 -0.2060 -0.1898 -0.1877
(-9.18) (-8.97) (-7.78) (-7.72) (-7.12) (-7.06)
Size -5.31E-17 -4.78E-17 -3.83E-17 -3.51E-17 -4.13E-17 -3.81E-17
(-5.05) (-4.70) (-4.14) (-3.95) (-4.20) (-4.01)
Sentiment 0.0106 0.0103 0.0112 0.0108 0.0115 0.0112
(4.02) (3.92) (4.22) (4.09) (4.35) (4.23)
Obs. 696,742 696,742 696,742 696,742 696,742 696,742
R2 0.0484 0.0480 0.0468 0.0465 0.0464 0.0462
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes17
increases when stock prices reach the static upper limit and static lower limit as well. Our
empirical results are agreeable with K. A. Kim and Rhee (1997) who show that volatility
does not return to normal levels as quickly as the stocks that do not reach price limits in
Tokyo Stock Exchange markets. These findings also support a recent paper by T. Chen
et al. (2019), who analyze the effect of daily price limits on market dynamics and detect
destructive trading behavior by a group of speculators against other investors resulting in
an unintended effect on the markets.
ROE and Leverage show positive effect on the conditional idiosyncratic volatility since
the capital structure of the listed firms can directly impact the idiosyncratic volatility, where
a higher level of leverage leads to a higher level of ROE. We find negative effect of Market-
to-book (M/B) and market capitalization (Size) on the conditional idiosyncratic volatility.
These results are consistent with the findings by Ferreira and Laux (2007). The coefficients of
the sentiment value are positive and statistically significant for all asset pricing models with
both GARCH and TGARCH specifications. Our empirical results are consistent with Wang
(2018a) and Wan et al. (2018), where their results indicate that high consumer expectations
distort the risk and return tradeoff, which may contribute to increases to the idiosyncratic
volatility. Further we find that time and firm fixed effects are supported as Lins, Servaes,
and Tamayo (2017) All results agree with both static upper and lower limits.
Table 4 and 5 presents the results of estimation of Model (6) for subgroups of KOSPI
firms, where the results of KOSPI 200 constituent stocks are shown in table 4 and KOSPI
general issues in table 5. All results are qualitatively the same as those found in Table
3. Compared with KOSPI general issues, KOSPI 200 constituent stocks indicate relatively
stable when stocks reach the static upper and lower bounds. Our results indicate the imple-
mentation of adopting static VI mechanism neither stabilize market conditions nor reduce
excess volatility along with the existence of price limits. As discussed by E. Fama (1989) and
Diacogiannis et al. (2005), these results support overreaction hypothesis that investors tend
to overreact when price hits limits. Although main purpose of adopting advanced volatility
interruption mechanism is to help stable and improve market conditions, we find the adverse
effect of the mechanism, indicating that market participants are exposed to the additional
risks when stock prices hit the upper and lower limits. As such, investors must not react
quickly to the price changes that may hit the limits in order to avoid the unintended excess
risk. We added the above discussion in the Conclusion section.
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Table 1.4: Conditional Idiosyncratic Volatility - KOSPI 200 Constituent Stocks
Table 4 reports the results of estimating the panel regression fixed effect models for KOSPI
200. The dependent variable is the firm’s conditional idiosyncratic volatility measured us-
ing GARCH (1, 1) and TGARCH (1, 1) from estimating the capital asset pricing model
(CAPM), Fama and French (1993) three-factor model, and Fama and French (2015) five-
factor model. Along with control variables, the main independent variables are static uppers
and lowers which are dummy variables that equal to 1 if they hit their thresholds and 0 oth-
erwise. Following the notion of Rogers (1993), we collect t-statistics. Panel A reports the
results of KOSPI 200 constituent stocks for static upper and lower limits. The sample period
is from June 15, 2015 to March 31, 2019.
CAPM FF 3-Factor FF 5-Factor
GARCH TGARCH GARCH TGARCH GARCH TGARCH
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Static Upper 0.3149 0.3144 0.3128 0.3125 0.3139 0.3137
(12.63) (12.64) (12.57) (12.59) (12.56) (12.57)
ROE 0.2098 0.2138 0.2084 0.2107 0.2075 0.2092
(12.65) (12.86) (12.99) (13.11) (12.98) (13.07)
Leverage -3.30E-11 -3.13E-11 -2.05E-11 -2.09E-11 -5.44E-11 -5.50E-11
(-0.42) (-0.39) (-0.56) (-0.56) (-1.28) (-1.29)
M/B -0.0324 -0.0334 -0.0293 -0.0293 -0.0069 -0.0067
(-1.09) (-1.12) (-1.01) (-1.01) (-0.24) (-0.23)
Size -2.40E-17 -2.59E-17 -2.64E-17 -2.73E-17 -3.32E-17 -3.40E-7
(-1.95) (-2.09) (-2.31) (-2.40) (-2.53) (-2.60)
Sentiment 0.0039 0.0040 0.0040 0.0042 0.0039 0.0040
(1.31) (1.37) (1.37) (1.44) (1.32) (1.37)
Obs. 180,077 180,077 180,077 180,077 180,077 180,077
R2 0.0313 0.0318 0.0321 0.0324 0.0321 0.0323
Static Lower 0.3562 0.3556 0.3544 0.3541 0.3560 0.3558
(10.99) (11.01) (10.97) (11.00) (10.98) (11.00)
ROE 0.2167 0.2206 0.2152 0.2175 0.2143 0.2160
(12.89) (13.10) (13.24) (13.37) (13.23) (13.32)
Leverage -3.20E-11 -3.04E-11 -1.95E-11 -1.99E-11 -5.34E-11 -5.40E-11
(-0.39) (-0.37) (-0.53) (-0.53) (-1.25) (-1.26)
M/B -0.0331 -0.0341 -0.0300 -0.0299 -0.0075 -0.0074
(-1.09) (-1.12) (-1.02) (-1.02) (-0.26) (-0.25)
Size -2.55E-17 -2.75E-17 -2.79E-17 -2.88E-17 -3.48E-17 -3.55E-17
(-2.05) (-2.20) (-2.41) (-2.50) (-2.63) (-2.70)
Sentiment 0.0040 0.0042 0.0042 0.0044 0.0041 0.0042
(1.37) (1.44) (1.43) (1.51) (1.39) (1.44)
Obs. 180,274 180,274 180,274 180,274 180,274 180,274
R2 0.0299 0.0304 0.0307 0.0311 0.0308 0.0310
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes19
Table 1.5: Conditional Idiosyncratic Volatility - KOSPI 200 Constituent Stocks
Table 5 reports the results of estimating the panel regression fixed effect models for KOSPI
200. The dependent variable is the firm’s conditional idiosyncratic volatility measured us-
ing GARCH (1, 1) and TGARCH (1, 1) from estimating the capital asset pricing model
(CAPM), Fama and French (1993) three-factor model, and Fama and French (2015) five-
factor model. Along with control variables, the main independent variables are static uppers
and lowers which are dummy variables that equal to 1 if they hit their thresholds and 0 oth-
erwise. Following the notion of Rogers (1993), we collect t-statistics. The sample period is
from June 15, 2015 to March 31, 2019.
CAPM FF 3-Factor FF 5-Factor
GARCH TGARCH GARCH TGARCH GARCH TGARCH
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Static Upper 0.5797 0.5816 0.5721 0.5742 0.5721 0.5742
(50.73) (50.92) (49.59) (49.82) (49.64) (49.88)
ROE 0.0697 0.0523 -0.0028 -0.0128 -0.0003 -0.0105
(3.96) (2.98) (-0.17) (-0.75) (-0.02) (-0.62)
Leverage 7.65E-10 7.44E-10 5.84E-10 5.76E-10 5.78E-10 5.70E-10
(8.58) (8.37) (6.82) (6.73) (6.44) (6.34)
M/B -0.3450 -0.3348 -0.2489 -0.2494 -0.2351 -0.2318
(-9.60) (-9.36) (-7.39) (-7.32) (-7.02) (-6.94)
Size -4.77E-17 -4.08E-17 -1.56E-17 -1.24E-17 -1.75E-17 -1.44E-17
(-4.14) (-3.81) (-2.63) (-2.48) (-2.56) (-2.42)
Sentiment 0.0135 0.0133 0.0146 0.0143 0.0148 0.0146
(4.04) (3.98) (4.31) (4.25) (4.39) (4.34)
Obs. 516,624 516,624 516,624 516,624 516,624 516,624
R2 0.0563 0.0557 0.0534 0.0531 0.0530 0.0527
Static Lower 0.6183 0.6206 0.6129 0.6153 0.6128 0.6154
(48.95) (49.16) (48.22) (48.45) (48.26) (48.51)
ROE 0.0997 0.0825 0.0265 0.0167 0.0290 0.0189
(5.62) (4.66) (1.55) (0.98) (1.69) (1.11)
Leverage 7.83E-10 7.62E-10 6.02E-10 5.94E-10 5.95E-10 5.87E-10
(8.57) (8.37) (6.87) (6.79) (6.50) (6.41)
M/B -0.3539 -0.3437 -0.2579 -0.2548 -0.2442 -0.2409
(-9.64) (-9.40) (-7.50) (-7.43) (-7.13) (-7.06)
Size -5.79E-17 -5.10E-17 -2.53E-17 -2.20E-17 -2.71E-17 -2.41E-17
(-4.36) (-4.02) (-2.84) (-2.68) (-2.77) (-2.62)
Sentiment 0.0124 0.0121 0.0134 0.0131 0.0137 0.0134
(3.66) (3.57) (3.91) (3.82) (3.99) (3.91)
Obs. 517,468 517,468 517,468 517,468 517,468 517,468
R2 0.0524 0.0519 0.0498 0.0496 0.0495 0.0492
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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1.6 Concluding Remarks
Since major market events such as the 1987 Black Monday and the 2010 Flash Crash,
many countries and exchanges have developed and adopted a new trading mechanism to im-
prove stable market conditions and decrease market volatility. Due to sequential adoptions
of price limits, dynamic VI, and static VI, the study of Korean markets allows us to see sep-
arate effects of those mechanisms respectively. In Korean stocks markets, the VI system was
built on top of a pre-existing price limits, indicating that stabilized market mechanisms are
required by investors, market regulators and policymakers. In this paper, we examine impact
of static VI in KOSPI market. We find that the conditional idiosyncratic volatility increases
when stock prices reach the upper or lower static limits. Moreover, the conditional idiosyn-
cratic volatility increases more when stock prices reach the lower static limit than when stock
prices reach the upper static limit. Although market regulators and policymakers improve
market conditions with the advanced volatility interruption mechanism, our empirical results
show the adverse effect of the mechanism, indicating that market participants are exposed
to the additional risks with price movements. Investors overreact or underreact based on
their information, and it compounds volatility. As such, the investors must not react quickly
to the price changes that may hit the limits in order to avoid the unintended excess risk.
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A p p e n d i x A
GLOBAL MARKET STRUCTURES
Table A.1: Global Market Structures
Appendix A reports the global market structures of circuit breakers. According to Abad
and Pascual (2013) there are two main types of circuit breakers: price limits and trading
halts. volatility interruptions. During trading halts, any trades cannot be executed. Price
limits allow trades to occur in certain thresholds thereby protecting investors from market
fluctuations. To improve price limits along with their own market regulations and polices,
global financial markets have adopted different combinations of mechanisms. All European
markets do not have price limits but adopt volatility interruption mechanisms. US markets
only partially adopt volatility interruption mechanisms. Compared with European and US
markets, Asian markets have price limits, but fully or partially adopt volatility interruption
mechanisms except Shanghai stock exchange (SSE).
Market Classification Price Limits Volatility Interruption
Dynamic VI Static VI
Europe
Euronext x o o
BME x o o
Deutsche Borsa x o o
LSE x o o
USA NYSE x o xNASDAQ x o x
Asia
JPX Average 22% o o
TWSE ±10% o x
SSE ±10% x x
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A p p e n d i x B
HISTORY OF PRICE LIMITS OF KOREA STOCK EXCHANGE (KRX)
Table B.1: Global Market Structures
Appendix B reports the changes in price limits in South Korean markets.
Period Price Limits Remarks
March 3, 1956 - March 31, 1995 2.2% - 6.7% Fixed Amount
April 1, 1995 - November 24, 1996 6% Fixed Fixed
November 25, 1996 - March 1, 1998 8% Fixed Fixed
March 2, 1998 - December 6, 1998 12% Fixed Fixed
December 7, 1998 - June 14, 2015 15% Fixed Fixed
June 15, 2015 - Present 30% Fixed Fixed
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A p p e n d i x C



































































































































































































































































































































































































































A p p e n d i x D
THRESHOLDS OF DYNAMIC AND STATIC VOLATILITY
INTERRUPTIONS IN SOUTH KOREAN MARKETS
Table D.1: Thresholds of Dynamic and Static Volatility Interruptions in South Korean
Markets
Appendix D reports the dynamic and static volatility interruption thresholds for Korean stock
markets. South Korean markets - KOSPI and KOSDAQ - offer different rates of thresholds
based on markets Dynamic VI is based on last execution price.
Dynamic VI Static VI
Classification
Continuous Closing Off-Hours
Trading Session Trading Session Single Price Regular
(09:00:15:20) (15:20-15:30) Trading Session Session
(16:00-18:00)
KOSPI 200 Constituents 3% 2% 3% 10%
General Issues 6% 4% 6% 10%
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A p p e n d i x E
SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR FACTOR RETURNS
Table E.1: Summary Statistics for Factor Returns
Appendix E presents factor returns for South Korea and emerging countries listed on Fama
and French website. Panel A reports Mean, Std Dev, and t-Mean for factor returns for two
different groups. Panel B reports the correlations of each factor and its shapes. The sample
period of factor returns is between April 1, 1995 and March 31, 2019.
Panel A. Mean, Standard Deviations, and t-Mean of Factor Returns
Mkt SMB HML RMW CMA
South Korea
Mean 0.1706 0.0981 -0.0914 -0.4541 0.1016
Std Dev 7.9868 5.3270 5.0293 4.0585 3.5346
t-Mean 0.4706 0.3139 0.2964 0.2391 0.2083
Emerging Countries
Mean 0.5795 0.0027 0.6618 0.2291 0.3053
Std Dev 6.1357 2.0171 2.1613 1.3948 1.6695
t-Mean 0.3615 0.1189 0.1274 0.0822 0.0984
Panel B. Correlation Matrices for Factors in Two Different Groups
Mkt South Korea Emerging Countries
South Korea 1.0000
Emerging Countries 0.6215 1
SMB South Korea Emerging Countries
South Korea 1.0000
Emerging Countries 0.4298 1
HML South Korea Emerging Countries
South Korea 1.0000
Emerging Countries 0.2192 1
RMW South Korea Emerging Countries
South Korea 1.0000
Emerging Countries -0.1285 1
CMA South Korea Emerging Countries
South Korea 1.0000
Emerging Countries 0.2006 1
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